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M.: Pleading--Parties--Name of Corporation--Amendment
STUDENT NOTES AND REGENT CASES
PLEADING.-PARTIES.-NAME

OF CORPORATION.-AMENDENT.-

A suit was brought by" The Kingman Mills, a branch of the Kansas
Flour Mills, a body corporate." Defendant demurred to the declaration for want of parties. Held, the misdescription of the plaintiff
is not demurrable, and amendment of the declaration pursuant to
section 14 of chapter 125 of the Code should be allowed. By way
of dissent two judges say that the action should be dismissed for
want of a plaintiff. Kingman Mills v. Furner, 109 S. E. 600. (W.
Va. 1921).
Obviously section 14 of chapter 125 of the Code is a piece of constructive legislation applicable only to cases where, at common law,
a plea in abatement would lie for a misnomer of a party to a suit.
In a true misnomer one purports to be acting as plaintiff or defendant, yet is named inaccurately and erroneously because of a
mistake in records or syllables either by omission, or interposition,
or interpolation. Illinois Mfg. Co. v. Starbird, 10 N. H. 123,
34 Am. Dec. 145. Is the principal case one of misnomer-an inaccurate and erroneous description remedial at common law by a plea
in abatement and under the Code by motion to amend? Is there
a misdescription analogous to the numerous cases illustrative of misnomer? The declaration clearly describes, and purports to set
forth the Kingman Mills as plaintiff. The words immediately
following constitute an explanatory modifier in the nature of surplus descriptive matter which would not materially affect the pleading if omitted entirely. To hold otherwise is to deprive words of
their true meaning and to tear them from their context to make
something which is not. Mason v. Farmers' Bank, 12 Leigh (Va.)
84. Concerning the suggestion of the majority of the court regarding transposition of the words so as "to more correctly state its
name", suffice it to say that where the meaning of words is clear,
there is neither necessity nor propriety in making transpositions
to meet the exigencies of the case. Mason v. Farmers' Bank, supra.
Several of the cases cited by the majority, including the partnership cases, are undoubtedly cases of true misnomer to which the
statute applies, and are not in point. Likewise, the case of Steamboat Pembinam etc. v. Wilson, 11 Iowa 479, is no authority for the
position of the majority because it holds that ah owner must sue
in Ais own name upon an obligation running to a non-entity, and
no one will deny that the Kansas Flour Mills, a corporation, can
sue in its own name upon an obligation to its branch. In view of
these facts that there is no misnomer; that the cases relied on are
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not analogous; and that the plain meaning of words should not
be distorted, it is submitted that the only plaintiff which the declaration purports to set out is the Kingman Mills, and since these
words cannot fairly be said to import either a natural person or
an artificial person having legal capacity, there is no plaintiff and
consequently the proceeding is a nullity from its inception.Western
etc. R. Co. v. Dalton Marble Works, 122 Ga. 774, 50 S. E. 978;
Mexican Mill v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 4 Nev. 40, 44, 97
Am. Dec. 510.
-M. H. M.

PROCESS-THE VERITY RULE-C NCLUSIVENESS Or, OFFICER's RE-

TURN.-The defendant sued the plaintiff in an action of debt. Process was returned as served on the plaintiff, but in fact service
was made on a third party. Judgment was rendered against the
plaintiff by default. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity to vacate the judgment. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer.
Held, that an officer's return is only prima
facie evidence of service where a defendant has no notice of pendency of the action in any manner or form. Reversed. Nuttalburg
Smokeless Fuel Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Harrisville, 109 S. E.
766 (W. Va. 1921.)
Formerly West Virginia followed the common law rule that as
between the parties, except in cases of fraud and collusion, a sheriff's return of process is conclusive evidence of service as to matters properly returnable by the officer. Milling Co. v. Read, 76
W. Va. 568, 85 S. E. 726; Bowyer v. Knapp, 15 W. Va. 277. The
court will not set aside a return by a sheriff. Goubot v. De Crouy,
3 Tyr. 906, 149 Eng. Reprint 611. Were the law otherwise, titles
might be attacked many years after they were acquired. Miedreich
v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236. This rule seems to have been based
on the necessity of securing the rights of the parties and of giving
validity and effect to acts of ministerial officers. Whether or not
this would be accomplished by making returns prima facie evidence
is a matter for legislation and not for the courts. Tillman v. Davis,
28 Ga. 494, 73 Am. Dec. 786. In the principal case the court points
out that the rule arose when the sheriff was the king's representative and partook of the king's fiction that he could do no wrong.
No such fiction exists here and our present method of selecting officers is no index of security or infallibility. Under the common
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